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Abstract
This paper proposes a panel data model to analyze contagion in a multivariate
framework. The model distinguishes between vulnerability and contagion, and provides
a time series of contagion. The most important feature of the model is the endogenous
determination of contagion without an a priori and potentially arbitrary specification of
the crisis period. In addition, the model can distinguish between positive and negative
contagion, and no assumption needs to be made about the source of the crisis. Eleven
stock markets from the Asian region are analyzed during the Asian financial crisis,
and contagion is found to be significant in four broad periods. These episodes are split
equally between positive and negative movements. Anecdotal evidence is matched to
the significant incidences of contagion, and it is found that events surrounding Hong
Kong equity markets are key drivers of contagion.
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1 Introduction
The incidence of financial crises in recent history has ignited a research agenda into the
nature of the spread of financial crises across borders. In particular, the role of ‘contagion’
as a conduit for financial crises has become an important focus. Contagion can be defined
as an increase of common movements in a set of financial asset markets in a particular
period of time (a crisis period) compared to a benchmark (non-crisis) period (see Baig and
Goldfajn, 1999 and Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).1 These recent methodologies developed
to understand contagion emphasize that normal interdependencies between markets need
to be accounted for before the spread of crises through contagious channels can be deter-
mined. Related to this point is the idea that countries sharing a regional location may be
subject to ‘common vulnerabilities’, making them susceptible to shocks from neighboring
countries (see Mody and Taylor, 2003).
From the definitions provided by Mody and Taylor, interdependencies arising from com-
mon vulnerabilities are explained by economic and financial variables, such as trade link-
ages, systematic capital flows and banking linkages. Contagion, on the other hand, is the
component that is unexplained and unexpected.2 This view of contagion is equivalent to
that of Masson (1999), where monsoonal and spillover effects represent vulnerabilities,
and the residual is contagion, and also that of Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000) where there is a distinction between ’fundamentals’ based contagion
and ’pure’ contagion. Again, fundamentals based contagion is consistent with vulnerabili-
ties, and pure contagion is consistent with our interpretation of contagion.
The focus of this paper is to examine the importance of contagion across a panel of
1A list of different definitions is provided by the World Bank (http://www1.worldbank.org/contagion/definitions.html)
and Pericoli and Sbracia (2001).
2Examples of mechanisms that theoretical models postulate may cause contagion include herding behavior,
information asymmetries and portfolio re-balancing (Calvo and Mendoza, 2000, Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
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eleven equity markets during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - 1998. A commonly used
methodology to analyze contagion in simultaneously falling equity markets over crisis pe-
riods is with the correlation coefficient compared to a benchmark (see Forbes and Rigobon,
2002, Karolyi and Stulz, 1996 and Longin and Solnik, 1995). Despite its simplicity, there
are several limitations of this approach, including that the correlation coefficient can be bi-
ased if heteroscedasticity is present (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), tests based on changes
in the correlation coefficient can have low power (see Dungey and Zhumabekova, 2001 and
Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin, 2005b), the correlation coefficient is inad-
equate in modeling non-linear phenomena such as contagion (see Bae, Karolyi and Stulz,
2003), only pairs of markets can be analyzed, and correlations between asset markets in a
crisis period can actually fall when contagion exists (Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia, 2001
and Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin, 2005b).
As the above points allude, several models of contagion have been developed in which a
selection of markets are modelled simultaneously. Examples include the vector autore-
gression (VAR) approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002), the probit model approach of
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996), the coexceedance approach of Bae, Karolyi
and Stulz (2003) and Baur and Schulze (2005), the latent factor approach of Dungey and
Martin (2004), Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2001, 2002) and Bekaert, Harvey and Ng
(2005) and the determinant of the change in the covariance matrix (DCC) approach of
Rigobon (2003). This paper contributes to the literature on multivariate contagion testing
by proposing a panel data model which controls for common vulnerabilities through re-
gional and global equity market indices, and models contagion through the significance of
fixed time effects. The fixed time effects are estimates of the time-varying joint movements
in Asian equity markets not explained by the regional or global factors. If on any date dur-
ing the crisis period the fixed time effect reaches a certain threshold, there is evidence of
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a large unexplained common factor that is interpreted as contagion.
A key advantage of defining contagion through the importance of fixed time effects and
using a large panel data set such as the one in this paper is that a relatively long time
varying time series measuring contagion can be extracted. This means that the problem
of sample selection bias identified in Pesaran and Pick (2004) is alleviated, as the model
is not explicitly identified through the ex post selection of a crisis period. The incidence
of contagion is endogenously determined, as the period over which the fixed time effects
are estimated extends for more than a year, and entirely encompasses the Asian crisis
period. Contagion is not necessarily a feature of the entire period in which the fixed time
effects are defined, rather its importance is assessed on a daily basis. Further advantages
of the approach include that negative and positive contagion can be distinguished, and no
assumption about the source country of the crisis needs to be made.
The daily nature of the time series of contagion also means that key events of the crisis
period can be analysed to gain some indication of whether these events tend to be associ-
ated with contagion. A brief chronology of the events of the financial crisis is presented in
Appendix A, and the contagion results are analysed with regard to this chronology. The
results indicate that there are four main periods in which contagion is significant, and
the break down of these instances are roughly split equally between negative and positive
episodes. Matching these periods with ‘news’ as outlined in the chronology suggests that
contagion in the Asian crisis was mainly associated with events in Hong Kong.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the panel data
model used to estimate common vulnerabilities and contagion, followed by a description of
the data set and the specification of the fixed time effects in Section 3. Section 4 provides
the chronology of the crisis, while the estimation results and a discussion on the robustness
of the model are contained in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Econometric Model
The section proposes a panel data model with fixed time effects to analyze contagion across
a selection of 11 Asian equity markets. The basic framework is a regression model of the
form
yi,t = αi + γt? + βi1fregional,t + βi2fglobal,t + ²i,t (1)
where yi,t is the return of country i at time t, and f regional,t and fglobal,t are regional and
global factors, respectively. The regional and global factors control for common vulnera-
bilities with corresponding parameters βi1 and βi2.3 The model contains a constant, αi,
for each country return vector yi and fixed time effects γt? which are defined for a period
of K units (e.g. days) through time across all countries i. The fixed time effects are to be
interpreted in comparison to a base period and captures contagion in this model. The error
terms of the model are given by ²i,t and are assumed to be identical and independently dis-
tributed (iid) with zero mean and unit variance. The model is estimated as a least-squares
dummy variable (LSDV) model (see Greene, 2002, page 565). Since correlation between
the fixed time effects and the factors controlling for common vulnerabilities cannot be ruled
out, no other specifications like the random-effects model is estimated. Dynamic specifica-
tions estimated with first-differences are reported in the robustness analysis section.
The model differentiates between common vulnerabilities and contagion. The former is
captured by global and regional factors and the latter by the fixed time effects. Vulnerabili-
ties exist in both the benchmark and crisis period and capture the systematic relationship
between the equity markets of each country and the region or the world. It is assumed
that the global and regional equity market indices adequately price economic and finan-
cial market risks as discussed in Mody and Taylor (2003). The fixed time effects γt? capture
3The model will also be estimated with homogeneous slopes (βi1 = βi for i = 1, 2).
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time-varying joint positive and negative movements across all asset markets that are not
explained by the regional or global factors in the period spanning from t0 until t0+K where
t? ∈ [t0, t0 + 1, ...t0 +K]; t0 denotes the beginning of the potential crisis period window and
t0 + K its ending. This potential crisis period can span the full sample period but is re-
stricted to a sub-sample for efficiency. If these fixed time effects reach certain thresholds,
there is evidence of a large unexplained common factor that is interpreted as contagion.
The threshold is considered to be reached if the t-statistic of an estimate of γt? is significant
at commonly used confidence levels. Although there is a distinction between ‘vulnerability’
(‘interdependence’) and ‘contagion’, it is suspected that some degree of interdependence is
a condition for the existence of contagion since a disease can only be transmitted through
contact even if this linkage is weak and unobservable.
Panel data have been rarely used in modelling contagion and crises. Most analysis has
been applied to crises in currency markets. As far as we are aware, no paper currently de-
fines contagion through the importance of fixed time effects. Fratzscher (1999, 2002) uses a
random effects panel model in estimating contagion in currency markets, while numerous
other papers draw on the panel methodology of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). For
further examples see Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (1996).
The most important advantage of the panel data model in equation (1) is that contagion
is endogenously determined and hence avoids the sample selection bias discussed in Pe-
saran and Pick (2004). The panel database is large enough to be able to specify a lengthy
duration over which the fixed time effects can be estimated. The robustness of the esti-
mates of the model to the selection of the length of the fixed time effects window is further
discussed in the next section. Assuming that the duration of the fixed time effects entirely
encompass the crisis period or a set of potential crisis periods, the exact dates on which
contagion is important is determined by the data itself.
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It is also worth emphasizing some additional features of the panel data model: First,
it is multivariate in nature, and is thus able to model global interdependencies better
than the popular correlation based approaches which are bivariate tests (see for example
Forbes and Rigobon, 2003 and the discussion in Pesaran and Pick, 2004). Second, the
fixed time effects measuring contagion distinguish between joint negative equity market
movements and joint positive movements. Intuitively, contagion is problematic when all
markets simultaneously plummet, but a simultaneous rise in all markets above that im-
plied by interdependencies may also constitute contagion. In commonly used frameworks
for testing of contagion, positive and negative contagion is not distinguished. Third, no
assumption as to the country from which contagion is sourced needs to be made. However,
the origin of contagion can be tested with the model. Finally, the model can statistically
assess the significance of contagion on a daily basis.
3 The Data and Fixed Time Effects
The data set consists of daily (close-to-close) continuously compounded stock index re-
turns of eleven Asian stock markets:4 China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Vulnerability arising from
both world and regional factors is controlled for in the model through the inclusion of the
returns of the MSCI World and the MSCI Emerging Markets Free (EMF) Asia indices,
respectively. The indices span a time-period of about 7 years from April 30, 1997 until
October 22, 2003, for a total of T = 1690 observations. The data is presented in figures 1 -
4.
Most of the countries in the sample were directly involved in the Asian financial crisis,
including Thailand and Hong Kong. Thailand’s devaluation and subsequent deprecia-
4The data is provided by Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI) and can be retrieved under
www.mscidata.com.
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tion of the Baht in July 1997, and Hong Kong’s speculative attack in October 1998 are
considered to be key crisis events. Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia are also crucial crisis
countries, while the peg of the Taiwanese dollar was broken just prior to the Hong Kong
speculative attack in October 1997. The Philippines also experienced large devaluations.
China is included in the sample as it is a large economy in the region, and after the han-
dover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 was presumably increasingly important to Hong
Kong in terms of investor expectations of the level of reserves accessible to fend off a spec-
ulative attack. Japan and Singapore are included in the sample as they are large financial
centers in Asia, and India is particularly interesting for the analysis of contagion since its
financial markets are rather isolated.
The fixed time effects are defined to extend from May 1, 1997 to May 29, 1998, a total
of 282 observations. The selection of these dates captures the period of the crisis, with ad-
ditional observations on either side. These dates encompass most others in the literature,
and is chosen to end before the build up of pressure in global financial markets prior to
the Russian crisis in August 1998. The subsample therefore captures more than ten times
the crisis period analyzed in many studies (e.g. see Baig and Goldfajn, 1999 and Forbes
and Rigobon, 2002). Dating of crises is always problematic. In particular, determining the
end date of a crisis is subjective compared to determining the beginning of a crisis which
is usually triggered by an extreme event. However, even the beginning of the Asian crisis
is not entirely agreed upon by researchers. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) motivate their se-
lection of the period surrounding the Hong Kong crash as their Asian crisis period, as it
was not until this time that media outside of Asia devoted attention to the crisis. Corsetti,
Pericoli and Sbracia (2002) and Dungey, Fry and Martin (2003) similarly use the Hong
Kong crash as the beginning of the Asian crisis period. Others including Baig and Gold-
fajn (1999) use the devaluation of the Thai baht as the beginning of the crisis period. A
8
robustness analysis to the dates over which the fixed time effects are defined is presented
in Section 5.3.
For completeness, Tables 6 to 8 present descriptive statistics and the unconditional cor-
relation structure for the stock return indices of the eleven countries over the total period
spanning April 1997 to October 2003, as well as for the period that the fixed time effects
are defined. The important points to note from these tables are that volatility over the
period of the fixed time effects is greater than over the entire sample period with the ex-
ceptions of Taiwan and India. Furthermore, the unconditional correlation coefficients are
all positive, reflecting regional and economic relationships. In most cases, the correla-
tion coefficients are also higher during the fixed time effects period compared to the total
sample period.
Insert figure 1 about here
Insert figure 2 about here
Insert figure 3 about here
Insert figure 4 about here
Insert table 6 about here
Insert table 7 about here
Insert table 8 about here
4 A Chronology of the Crisis
The daily time series of the fixed time effects makes it pertinent to examine the events
surrounding the dates where a value of a fixed time effect indicates evidence of significant
contagion to try to determine likely triggers or explanations of contagion. With this aim
in mind, a chronology of the Asian crisis is constructed over the period that the fixed time
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effects are defined using events that a priori may be expected to contribute to unantici-
pated volatility in the regions equity markets. This chronology is contained in Appendix
A. The empirical results for contagion of the next section are discussed in line with this
chronology. The approach is similar to those whereby authors construct dummy variables
to capture news events and then include them as explanatory variables in a model of con-
tagion such as Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999b) and Debelle
and Ellis (2005).
The chronology is classified into four types of events. The first is key crisis events which
essentially encompasses the suspension or closure of financial entities, currency devalu-
ations or large widening of currency trading bands, government packages to address the
crisis, and other coordinated international responses such as the roll over of Korea’s pri-
vate short term debt by international creditors. The second consists of events relating to
the involvement of the IMF in the crisis. This includes requests for IMF assistance, the
announcement of rescue packages, disbursements of funds, countries’ letters of intent as
submitted to the IMF as well as progress reviews. The third category captures major politi-
cal events such as change in government and the resignation of key ministers/bureaucrats,
while the fourth documents sovereign ratings changes by Moody’s Investors Service and
Standard and Poor’s (see Moody’s Investors Service, 2002, and Standard and Poor’s, 2004,
for details). The chronology contains 31 key events, 30 IMF policy events, 13 political
events and 51 rating events.
Several useful chronologies documenting the crisis in Asia are available. The ones
drawn upon in this paper include Bank for International Settlements (1998), Roubini
(1998), the Washington Post (1998), the BBC (1998), IMF (2000, 1999), Lindgren, Bal-
iño, Enoch, Gulde, Quintyn and Teo (1999) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999a,b). More
country specific chronologies are documented in Cameron (1999), Soesastro and Bastri
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(1998) and IMF (1998) for Indonesia, Ministry of Finance (1999), Warr (2001) and Siamwalla
(2001) for Thailand, Athukorala (2001) and Jomo (1998) for Malaysia, and Chopra, Kang,
Karasulu, Liang, Ma and Richards (2001) for Korea.
5 Empirical Results
This section presents the results for the estimation of the model of vulnerability and con-
tagion specified in equation (1). Estimation results of the parameters of vulnerability are
given in table 9. Results of the fixed time effects estimates are shown in tables 10 and 11.
These tables contain the date, the estimated coefficients and their corresponding t-values.
The bottom panel of the table reports an R2 of 31.46%, and a F-statistic of 18.26 testing the
joint significance of the exogenous variables and the fixed time effects. The hypothesis of
’no significance’ is clearly rejected.
Insert table 9 about here
Insert table 10 about here
Insert table 11 about here
5.1 Vulnerabilities
The results show that vulnerabilities are generally important for all countries of the sam-
ple. The world index which captures global vulnerabilities has a positive effect and is sig-
nificant for the countries with the most developed financial markets, namely Hong Kong,
Singapore and Japan. The parameter estimates for these countries range between 0.11
and 0.37, with t-values between 2.2 and 7.2. World returns are almost significant for Ko-
rea, who became a member of the OECD prior to the Asian crisis in 1996, with a t-value of
1.61. China is also significantly impacted by the world returns index. Interestingly, global
vulnerabilities are not as significant for countries with less developed equity markets such
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as Indonesia, India, Thailand and the Philippines. Regional vulnerabilities have a signifi-
cant and positive impact on all countries of the sample, probably reflecting trade, financial
and economic linkages arising geographically. The parameter estimates on the MSCI Asia
index range between 0.27 for Japan, to 1.33 for Korea. It is likely that regional linkages
are relatively more important for countries with less developed financial markets due to
trade linkages compared to overall world linkages.
5.2 Contagion
The time series of the fixed time effects is presented in figure 5. The first panel of the figure
presents the coefficient estimates, and the second panel presents the t-value associated
with each estimate along with the corresponding 99 percent critical values. Inspection of
this figure shows evidence of joint contagion across all eleven countries for equity returns
in four clear episodes as measured by their significance at the 99 percent level. When
contagion is evident, the parameter estimates of the fixed time effects are generally large
in absolute terms, and tend to cluster. The episodes of contagion correspond to the periods:
(i) September 1 to September 3, 1997, (ii) October 23 to October 29, 1997, (iii) December
11, 12 and 22, 1997 and (iv) January 7 to February 16, 1998 along with several dates in
March and May of 1998 which are not so clustered together.
Altogether there are 23 dates on which there is contagion, which represents approxi-
mately eight percent of all observations in the fixed time effects window. On the remaining
92 percent of days, equity market prices are determined by global and regional vulnerabil-
ities. It is also clear that contagion is not just a negative phenomenon marked by simul-
taneously falling equity markets. There are about as many instances of positive contagion
as negative contagion. Some of the instances of positive contagion are also quite large in
terms of absolute value. This is an important finding with implications for investor diver-
12
sification and optimal portfolio allocation, as portfolio diversification decisions are made
based on measures of the strength and direction of the common movement of asset prices.
Insert figure 5 about here
(i) September 1 to September 3, 1997 The key item of news to hit financial mar-
kets in the first period of contagion corresponding to September 1 to 3 in 1997 was the
announcement on September 1 that the Malaysian Government had imposed restrictions
on forward sales of the ringgit and banned short-selling in equity markets (Appendix A,
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999b, Athukorala, 2001). The fixed time effect on September
3 is positive (0.02), compared to the negative value of -0.02 on September 1. The similarity
of the absolute magnitudes of these contagious events also suggests a market correction.
(ii) October 23 to 29, 1997 The second period of contagion overlaps the period of the
Hong Kong speculative attack and equity market crash of October 1997 and the follow-
ing US equity market crash where the US Dow Jones lost over 7 percent of its value in
one day (see Appendix A, BBC 1998, Roubini 1998, and the Washington Post, 1998). The
Hong Kong speculative attack began on December 20th and lasted for just over a week,
with most of the impact felt on the 20th to the 23rd. This event is considered to be one
of the most important of the Asian crisis. The fixed effects are not significant for every
day of the period of the attack, but are significant on October 23, 28 and 29, as is clearly
demonstrated in Figure 5. The parameters are negative on October 23 and 28, but there is
evidence of positive contagion on October 29, potentially indicating the end of the specula-
tive attack and a reversal in market sentiment. The negative contagion effect on October
28 reflects the response (given the time difference between New York and Asia) of the
Asian markets to the US crash. Several countries were also downgraded or put on review
for downgrade by Moody’s and Standard and Poors during the turbulent Hong Kong crash
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period.
(iii) December 11, 12 and 22, 1997 The third period of contagion which occurs on
December 11, 12 and 22, 1997 corresponds to issues affecting Korea at this time. An in-
ternal IMF document leaked on December 10 stated that two banks would close, foreign
exchange reserves had rapidly depleted, and short term debt was almost double that sug-
gested in government statements (Appendix A, Roubini, 1998). On December 11 and 12,
trading of the Korean Won was halted in reaction to the previous days news, and equity
markets fell markedly during this time. On December 22, the sovereign debt ratings of
Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea were downgraded by Moody’s investor service. Over the
course of 1997 this represented a downgrade from an investment grade rating to junk
status for Korea.
(iv) January to May, 1998 The fourth period of contagion in early 1998 is the longest
in duration and the most extreme in terms of magnitude of the parameter estimates. The
chronology shows that there was substantial financial, economic and political turmoil in
many countries throughout the region over this time, and there are clear instances of both
negative and positive contagion effects reflecting the intensity of the uncertainty of this
period. In the month of January there are four instances of negative contagion (January
7, 8, 15 and 22), and five instances of positive contagion (January 13, 14, 19, 26 and 27).
Apart from one more instance of positive contagion on February 2, contagion is negative
on February 13 and 16, March 5 and 6, and May 13, 1998.
Negative contagion on January 8 coincides with turmoil in Indonesian financial mar-
kets; reports hit the market that the IMF was unhappy with Indonesia’s commitment to
reform. Equity markets fell by up to 19 percent over the day, and the Rupiah per USD ex-
change rate broke 10,000 which was 70 percent lower than the rate of July 1997 (Roubini,
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1998). Indonesia was in the midst of its crisis in January, with political uncertainty sur-
rounding the forthcoming presidential elections. Further, Korea, who had successfully
negotiated with foreign banks to roll over their short term debt in the previous December,
was negotiating the rollover of the US Dollar 20 billion in short term debt due later in
the month (Roubini, 1998), although Korea was also the beneficiary of US Dollar 2 billion
from the IMF earlier in the month. Thailand and Indonesia were downgraded by rating
agencies, and several other countries were due to have their ratings announced in the sub-
sequent days. The value of the fixed time effect on this date is −0.044 and is significant
with a t-value of −7.15 indicating quite extreme negative contagion amongst most of the
countries in the sample.
The significant fixed time effects of January 13, 14 and 22, 1998, appear to be driven
by market sentiment. The fixed time effect is positive on January 14 with a value of 0.032.
Regional equity markets rebounded because of positive sentiment surrounding the IMF
program being developed for Indonesia (Roubini, 1998), and Hong Kong bank rates fell
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999a), despite the collapse of the Hong Kong based Peregrine
Investments which collapsed the previous day. The negative fixed time effect on January
22 reflects uncertainty in Indonesia and a further plummet of the Rupiah which impacted
on regional equity markets (Roubini, 1998 and Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999a). The
announcement of the creation of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency on January
22 did little to instill confidence in the markets.
In the final period of positive contagion between January 26 and February 2, 1998,
events in Korea and Indonesia were largely in the headlines. Korea successfully negotiated
the roll over of a series of short term debt contracts into longer term instruments, which in
turn strengthened the Korean banking sector (Appendix A, BBC, 1998 and Roubini, 1998).
This was accompanied by the closure of many illiquid merchant banks, while the banking
15
sector in Indonesia was also under reform (Roubini, 1998 and Kaminsky and Schmukler,
1999a). The final dates on which contagion is extreme are February 13 and 16, March 3,
May 6 and 13. Contagion during this period of the crisis seems likely to be linked to civil
and political unrest in Indonesia, as well as the intense debate about the suitability of a
currency board for Indonesia and the IMF’s subsequent adverse reaction.
Insert figure 6 about here
The impact of Hong Kong, Indonesia and Korea In matching contagion with
anecdotal news events, no one type of event detailed in the chronology appeared to be a
cause of contagion. The turmoil of early 1998 featured in the timing of contagion, but there
does not appear to be a systematic event causing contagion. However, Hong Kong, Indone-
sia and Korea (three of the key crisis countries) seem to be prominently in the headlines
corresponding to days on which contagion was important. The hypothesis that the Hong
Kong speculative attack is an important event in the crisis is supported by the results of
this paper with the detection of contagion during the October 1997 period. To examine
the importance of Hong Kong in explaining contagion, Hong Kong returns are included in
the vector of exogenous variables and the model is reestimated. The resulting parameter
estimates of the fixed time effects and the corresponding t-values are presented in figure
6. Controlling for Hong Kong eliminates most of the periods of contagion, with the excep-
tion of some of the dates in early January 1998. This result confirms the importance of
the Hong Kong attack in contributing to asset market volatility during the period. The
inclusion of Hong Kong as an explanatory variable in the model increases the value of R2
considerably from 31.46% to 37.16%. The F-statistic is lower but still significant. Perform-
ing similar experiments with the Korean, Indonesian and Thai returns does not markedly
eliminate the period of contagion.
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5.3 Robustness Analysis
The estimates of contagion depend on the exogenous variables in the model and the pe-
riod over which the fixed time effects are defined. In addition to specifically accounting for
Hong Kong, Indonesia and Korea as in the previous section, five experiments are under-
taken to evaluate the robustness of the model to alternative specifications. The first two
experiments evaluate the robustness of the definition of the fixed time effects, the third
and fourth experiments evaluate the importance of the variables measuring vulnerabili-
ties, while the final experiment estimates a model without controlling for vulnerabilities.
Figures 7 and 8 present the parameter estimates of the fixed time effects for each of the
experiments.
The panel model was also estimated with homogeneous slopes for the common factors,
as well as a dynamic specification with lagged dependent and independent variables in
first differences. These alternative specifications did not change the incidence of conta-
gion. Therefore, the results are not reported. Finally, the model was also estimated using
Newey-West heteroscedastic and serial correlation consistent standard errors. This ad-
justment reduced the t-values of the fixed time effects, but only notably for periods of joint
positive contagion. The occurances of simultaneous negative contagion are still significant
with this correction.
In the first and second experiments, restricted versions of the model presented in equa-
tion (1) are estimated by redefining the window of the fixed time effects. In the first ex-
periment the period that encompasses the crisis is extended by 100 trading days, so that
the fixed time effects are defined over May 1, 1997 to October 16, 1998, for a total of 382
trading days. Similarly, in the second experiment, the time-window for the fixed time ef-
fects is moved ‘to the right’ by specifying the value of t0 to begin 50 trading days later.
This also means that the fixed time effects end 50 trading days later. The window is thus
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redefined from July 9, 1997 to August 7, 1998. In both cases, the redefinition of the fixed
time effect do not significantly change the fixed time effects estimates compared to the
original window. In experiment one, some additional dates where contagion is significant
are detected, but this is probably due to the Russian bond default of August 1998 and the
preceding financial market pressures. This is shown graphically in the first panel of figure
7. Because the sample does not include countries important to this crisis such as Russia,
no analysis is provided of these additional contagious episodes. In both cases, the parame-
ters measuring vulnerabilities βˆi1 and βˆi2, change slightly, while the R2 and the F -statistic
increase. Since neither of the modifications to the fixed time effects window dramatically
change the characteristics of the fixed time effects series, it is reasonable to conclude that
the estimates are rather robust to such variations.
Insert figure 7 about here
Insert figure 8 about here
Experiments three to five examine the relative importance of the variables measuring
vulnerability in equation (1). In the third experiment, the condition βi1 = 0 ∀i is im-
posed and vulnerability is defined only with respect to the world factor. The parameter
estimates of the fixed time effects, γˆt? do not considerably change, but the values of βˆi2
markedly increase with many estimates more than quadrupling. The R2 value decreases
to 14.21%, and the corresponding F-statistic increases to F = 109.7231. Similar results
hold in experiment four, where only regional vulnerabilities are considered by excluding
the MSCI World Index. That is, βi2 = 0 ∀i. Again, the characteristics and especially the
extremes of the fixed time effects do not change. However, the estimates of βˆi1 slightly
increase for all markets. The R2 value decreases slightly and the F-statistic increases con-
siderably. In the final experiment, both vulnerability factors are excluded, and only the
fixed time effects are estimated (βij = 0 ∀i, j). Just estimating the fixed time effects yields
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more volatile parameter estimates and also more extremes. The R2 drops to 11.93% and
the F-statistic is 247.11. Figure 8 shows the difference of the fixed time effects for the base
model presented in equation (1) and the restricted model with βij = 0 ∀i, j. The results
of the robustness analysis support the idea that vulnerabilities account for a significant
amount of comovement and affect the incidence of contagion.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented a multivariate test for contagion using panel data analysis tech-
niques for the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. The methodology controlled for common
vulnerabilities which arise through countries susceptibility to shocks from nearby coun-
tries, as well as from global financial markets through economic and financial linkages.
Contagion was defined as unexpected and significant joint positive or negative movements
in the asset returns of the relevant countries, and was modelled through the significance
of fixed time effects.
This approach of analyzing contagion has several advantages. First, the large panel
data set enables a long time varying time series to be extracted to measure contagion.
This means that the sample selection bias problem discussed in Pesaran and Pick (2004)
is overcome, and the level of contagion can be determined endogenously as it is possible to
specify a fixed time effect window which encompasses the entire crisis period. The second
advantage is that the methodology is able to distinguish between positive and negative
contagion. This has important implications for investors trying to diversify their portfo-
lios internationally. A final advantage is that the source country from which contagion
emanated can be detected but does not need to be identified.
The results showed that there were four periods where contagion was significant. These
were (i) September 1 to September 3, 1997, (ii) October 23 to October 29, 1997, (iii) De-
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cember 11, 12 and 22, 1997 and (iv) January 7 to February 16, 1998 along with several
dates in March and May of 1998. This is equivalent to about eight percent of observations
over the crisis period. The remaining dates over the period in which the fixed time effects
were defined did not display evidence of contagion; asset market volatility on these dates
can be explained by vulnerabilities. Analyses of the events of the dates on which the fixed
time effects are significant anecdotally suggest that much contagion can be explained by
shocks in the Hong Kong market, particularly the Hong Kong speculative attack of Octo-
ber 1997. Contagion also seemed to surround events in Indonesia and Korea. Comparing
the dates on which contagion occurred with a chronology of the crisis indicated that there
did not seem to be a ‘type’ of event such as a IMF policy, political or rating event which
systematically caused contagion. Finally, there were almost as many positive instances of
contagion as negative ones.
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A Appendix A: Chronology of the Crisis.
This chronology documents events that occurred during the Asian crisis period. These
events are sorted into four categories. These are key crisis events, IMF policy events,
political events and country rating events. Five tables are presented which contain the
relevant details. Table 1 documents the key crisis (economic) events, table 2 documents
key IMF policy related events, table 3 documents key political events and tables 4 and 5
document sovereign ratings changes for the relevant sample countries in 1997 and 1998
respectively.
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Table 1: Chronology of the Asian crisis - key crisis events.
Date Country Event
1997
Jun 27 Thailand Suspension of 16 finance companies.
Jul 2 Thailand Baht devaluation.
11 Indonesia Trading band around the rupiah widened.
The Philippines Trading band around the ringgit widened.
14 Malaysia Defense of the ringgit abandoned.
Aug 5 Thailand 42 finance companies suspended.
14 Indonesia Float of the rupiah.
Sep 1 Malaysia First capital controls instituted.
16 Indonesia Government policy to address crisis announced.
Oct 17 Taiwan Devaluation of New Taiwan dollar.
Thailand Financial sector restructuring agency established.
Malaysia 1998 budget announced. Widely interpreted as inadequate.
20-23 Hong Kong Speculative attack.
27 US NYSE briefly halts trading.
Nov 1 Indonesia Closure of 16 banks announced.
17-19 Korea Widening of trading band around won. Won trading suspended.
17 Japan Hokkaido Takushoku Bank collapses.
24 Japan Yamaichi securities collapses.
Dec 5 Malaysia Policy package to deal with the crisis announced.
8 Thailand Only 2 of the suspended finance companies to resume trading.
9 Korea Govt. takes over two major banks to prevent their collapse.
11-12 Korea Trading of won halted.
24 Korea Moves to avoid debt moratorium in Korea. World Bank and
Asian Development Bank to disburse USD5bn.
29 Korea Financial Supervision Commission Established.
1998
Jan 6 Indonesia Budget.
7 Malaysia National Economic Action Council established to deal with crisis.
12 Hong Kong Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd collapses.
22 Indonesia Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) created
and other reforms.
23 Korea Foreign banks agree to roll over Korea’s short term debt.
30 Korea 10 merchant banks closed.
Mar 24 Malaysia Announcement that three banks may need recapitalization.
27 Japan $133 bn fiscal stimulus package announced.
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Table 2: Chronology of the Asian crisis - IMF policy events.
Date Country Event
1997
Jul 2 Thailand Call for IMF assistance.
18 The Philippines IMF extends and increases the current extended fund facility credit.
Aug 11 Thailand IMF rescue package announced.
14 Thailand Letter of intent.
20 Thailand US4bn stand by credit approved, US1.6bn disbursed.
Oct 8 Indonesia Announcement of intention to seek support from the IMF.
31 Indonesia Indonesia letter of intent.
Nov 5 Indonesia US10bn stand-by credit approved, US3bn disbursed.
21 Korea Request for IMF assistance.
25 Thailand Letter of intent.
Dec 4 Korea US21bn stand-by credit approved, US5.6bn disbursed.
8 Thailand Review of the stand-by arrangement completed, US810mn disbursed.
10 Korea Internal IMF document leaked stating two banks to close, FX reserves low,
short term debt almost double government statements.
18 Korea US3.5bn disbursed.
30 Korea Part of the amount scheduled for February and May 1998 brought forward
and US2bn disbursed.
1998
Jan 7 Korea Letter of intent.
8 Korea US2bn disbursed.
8 Indonesia Report of IMF’s unhappiness with Indonesia’s commitment to reform.
15 Indonesia Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies.
17 Malaysia IMF announces that Malaysia does not require assistance.
Feb 7 Korea Letter of intent.
13 Indonesia IMF opposes Indonesia’s suggestion of adopting a currency board.
17 Korea Quarterly review of the stand-by arrangement completed, US2bn disbursed.
24 Thailand Letter of intent.
Mar 4 Thailand Second review of the stand-by arrangement completed, US270mn disbursed.
Apr 10 Indonesia Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial policies.
May 4 Indonesia First review of the stand-by arrangement completed and US1bn disbursed.
26 Thailand Letter of intent.
29 Korea Second quarterly review of the stand-by completed, US2bn disbursed.
Jun 10 Thailand Third review of the stand-by arrangement, US125mn disbursed.
24 Indonesia Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial policies.
Jul 15 Indonesia Second review of the stand-by arrangement completed, US1bn disbursed.
Increase in IMF financing under the stand-by credit by US1.3bn announced.
24 Korea Letter of intent.
29 Indonesia Letter of intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial policies.
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Table 3: Chronology of the Asian crisis - key political events.
Date Country Event
1997
Sep 1 Malaysia Mahathir sacks finance minister Ibrahim.
Nov 4 Thailand Prime Minister Chavalit resigns.
5 Indonesia Decision to reverse liquidation of Bank Andromeda, belonging
to Suharto’s son.
9 Thailand Chuan Leekpai new Prime Minister.
18 Korea Finance minister resigns.
Dec 6 Indonesia Rumors of Suharto’s ill health.
18 Korea Kim Dae Jung elected new president.
1998
Feb 9-12 Indonesia Govt considers adopting currency board. Six students killed in riots.
17 Indonesia Suharto fires Central Bank governor.
Mar 10 Indonesia Suharto re-elected.
May 21 Indonesia Suharto resigns. Habibe successor.
30
Table 4: Chronology of the Asian crisis - key rating events 1997.
Date Country Event
1997
Jun 24 Thailand Moody’s rating confirmed, with negative outlook.
Aug 1 Thailand Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
6 Korea Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
18 Malaysia Standard and Poors outlook changed from positive to stable.
Sep 3 Thailand Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
9 Thailand Moody’s rating on review for downgrade.
25 Malaysia Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
25 The Philippines Standard and Poors outlook changed from positive to stable.
Oct 1 Thailand Moody’s rating downgraded with stable outlook.
6 India Standard and Poors outlook changed from positive to stable.
10 Indonesia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, stable outlook.
22 Thailand Moody’s rating on review for downgrade.
24 Korea Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
24 Thailand Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
27 Indonesia Moody’s rating outlook changed to negative.
Nov 25 Korea Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
27 Korea Moody’s rating downgraded with stable outlook.
27 Thailand Moody’s rating downgraded with negative outlook.
Dec 10 Korea Moody’s rating downgraded, on review for further downgrade.
11 Korea Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
21 Various Moody’s rating confirmed for China, Hong Kong, Japan,
The Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan.
21 Various Moody’s ratings downgraded for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia
and Thailand.
22 Korea Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
23 Malaysia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
31 Indonesia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
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Table 5: Chronology of the Asian crisis - key rating events 1998.
Date Country Event
1998
Jan 8 India Moody’s rating on review for downgrade.
8 Thailand Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
9 Indonesia Moody’s and Standard and Poors ratings downgraded.
Korea Moody’s rating on review for downgrade.
16 Korea Standard and Poors rating changed to developing.
27 Indonesia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
28 Singapore Moody’s rating confirmed, stable outlook.
Feb 2 China Moodys rating changed to negative outlook.
5 Malaysia Moodys rating changed to negative outlook.
7 Hong Kong Moodys rating changed to negative outlook.
18 Korea Standard and Poors rating upgraded, stable outlook.
23 The Philippines Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
Mar 11 Indonesia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
20 Indonesia Moody’s rating downgraded with stable outlook.
30 Korea Moody’s rating confirmed.
Apr 2 Japan Moodys rating changed to negative outlook.
17 Malaysia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, stable outlook.
May 15 Indonesia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
22 India Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
Jun 4 Malaysia Moody’s rating on review for downgrade.
19 India Moody’s rating downgraded with stable outlook.
22 Honk Kong Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
Jul 16 China Standard and Poors outlook changed from stable to negative.
23 Japan Moodys rating changed to negative outlook.
23 Malaysia Moody’s rating downgraded with stable outlook.
24 Malaysia Standard and Poors rating downgraded, negative outlook.
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Figure 1: Daily continuously compounded stock index returns of selected countries: April
30, 1997 to October 22, 2003
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Figure 2: Daily continuously compounded stock index returns of selected countries: April
30, 1997 to October 22, 2003
34













Taiwan     






Thailand   
Figure 3: Daily continuously compounded stock index returns of selected countries: April
30, 1997 to October 22, 2003
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Figure 4: Daily continuously compounded MSCI WORLD and MSCI Emerging Markets
Free (EMF) Asia return indices: April 30, 1997 to October 22, 2003
36
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of continuously compounded stock index returns: April 30,
1997 to October 22, 2003
Market Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
China -0.0008 0.0235 -0.1444 0.1274 0.0838 6.7425
Hong Kong -0.0001 0.0195 -0.1377 0.1601 0.1772 11.0052
India 0.0001 0.0170 -0.0732 0.0782 -0.1901 5.3206
Indonesia -0.0008 0.0392 -0.4306 0.2381 -0.9206 20.0683
Japan -0.0001 0.0159 -0.0716 0.1227 0.3765 6.0370
Korea 0.0002 0.0322 -0.2167 0.2688 0.3021 10.5934
Malaysia -0.0004 0.0262 -0.3695 0.2568 -0.7011 43.1146
The Philippines -0.0009 0.0203 -0.1036 0.2197 1.2229 16.8339
Singapore -0.0003 0.0186 -0.1003 0.1552 0.4859 9.4968
Taiwan -0.0003 0.0198 -0.1113 0.0739 0.0389 4.9489
Thailand -0.0005 0.0270 -0.1489 0.1644 0.6949 8.3497
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of continuously compounded stock index returns over the
period of the fixed time effect: May 1, 1997 to May 29, 1998
Market Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
China -0.0024 0.0308 -0.1444 0.1274 -0.1025 7.0513
Hong Kong -0.0017 0.0282 -0.1377 0.1601 0.3537 10.4881
India -0.0005 0.0138 -0.0434 0.0484 -0.0881 3.8202
Indonesia -0.0071 0.0680 -0.4306 0.2381 -1.0992 10.6949
Japan -0.0008 0.0171 -0.0579 0.0785 0.2776 5.1391
Korea -0.0035 0.0498 -0.2167 0.2688 0.5596 9.1116
Malaysia -0.0041 0.0402 -0.1262 0.2568 1.1889 10.2783
The Philippines -0.0023 0.0278 -0.1036 0.1320 0.3466 5.7616
Singapore -0.0024 0.0265 -0.1003 0.1552 0.8462 9.4739
Taiwan -0.0012 0.0190 -0.1113 0.0627 -0.6947 7.4313
Thailand -0.0044 0.0407 -0.1489 0.1644 0.7216 5.7182
Table 8: Correlation matrix of continuously compounded stock index returns: April 30,
1997 to October 22, 2003
China 1.0000 0.6194 0.1935 0.2637 0.2876 0.2749 0.2738 0.2917 0.4449 0.2665 0.3215
Hong Kong 0.6909 1.0000 0.2245 0.3372 0.3487 0.3161 0.3092 0.3362 0.6046 0.2948 0.3757
India 0.1692 0.2408 1.0000 0.1090 0.1552 0.2051 0.1195 0.1301 0.1950 0.1372 0.1829
Indonesia 0.3402 0.4083 0.1313 1.0000 0.1992 0.1742 0.3281 0.3458 0.4293 0.1790 0.3689
Japan 0.2352 0.3424 0.0737 0.1942 1.0000 0.2822 0.2162 0.2110 0.3782 0.2394 0.2599
Korea 0.0611 0.0805 0.1416 0.1088 0.1121 1.0000 0.2024 0.2070 0.2961 0.2680 0.3230
Malaysia 0.3220 0.3788 0.1614 0.4977 0.2277 0.2092 1.0000 0.2484 0.3864 0.1770 0.3558
The Philippines 0.3835 0.4512 0.1644 0.4596 0.1724 0.1429 0.4538 1.0000 0.4079 0.1746 0.3756
Singapore 0.5372 0.6691 0.2051 0.5806 0.3286 0.0635 0.5959 0.6180 1.0000 0.3190 0.4638
Taiwan 0.3302 0.3344 0.0750 0.2488 0.2314 0.0845 0.3229 0.2848 0.3765 1.0000 0.2482
Thailand 0.2819 0.3211 0.2208 0.3980 0.1866 0.2176 0.4819 0.4544 0.4701 0.3066 1.0000
upper triangular matrix is the correlation of the full sample period, lower triangular matrix is the correlation for the fixed
effects period
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Table 9: Estimation results of equation (1): regional and global vulnerabilities
Regional factor (EMF Asia) βˆi1 t-value
China 0.6901 20.1861










Global factor (MSCI World) βˆi2 t-value
China 0.1110 2.1519














Table 10: Estimation results of equation (1): Fixed time effect and contagion
k Date γˆt?+k t-value k Date γˆt?+k t-value k Date γˆt?+k t-value
1 5/1/1997 0.0023 0.3769 51 7/10/1997 -0.0001 -0.0235 101 9/18/1997 -0.0025 -0.4046
2 5/2/1997 0 -0.0057 52 7/11/1997 -0.0013 -0.2108 102 9/19/1997 0.0001 0.0202
3 5/5/1997 0.0057 0.9167 53 7/14/1997 0.0024 0.3951 103 9/22/1997 -0.0036 -0.5869
4 5/6/1997 0.0072 1.1591 54 7/15/1997 0.0026 0.4282 104 9/23/1997 -0.0041 -0.658
5 5/7/1997 -0.0025 -0.3971 55 7/16/1997 0.0035 0.5731 105 9/24/1997 0.0058 0.9458
6 5/8/1997 -0.0023 -0.3764 56 7/17/1997 0.0025 0.4073 106 9/25/1997 0.0112 1.8079
7 5/9/1997 0.0021 0.339 57 7/18/1997 0.007 1.1296 107 9/26/1997 -0.0065 -1.0508
8 5/12/1997 0.0075 1.2071 58 7/21/1997 -0.0052 -0.8505 108 9/29/1997 -0.0069 -1.1105
9 5/13/1997 0.0009 0.1508 59 7/22/1997 0.0001 0.0088 109 9/30/1997 0.0033 0.5289
10 5/14/1997 -0.002 -0.3321 60 7/23/1997 -0.0004 -0.0671 110 10/1/1997 0.0013 0.2039
11 5/15/1997 -0.0019 -0.3076 61 7/24/1997 -0.0031 -0.5102 111 10/2/1997 -0.0005 -0.087
12 5/16/1997 -0.0048 -0.7797 62 7/25/1997 0 0.0009 112 10/3/1997 -0.006 -0.9735
13 5/19/1997 0.002 0.3298 63 7/28/1997 0.0008 0.1353 113 10/6/1997 -0.0057 -0.927
14 5/20/1997 0.0054 0.8718 64 7/29/1997 -0.0015 -0.2353 114 10/7/1997 -0.0082 -1.3281
15 5/21/1997 -0.0007 -0.121 65 7/30/1997 -0.0002 -0.0376 115 10/8/1997 -0.0045 -0.7236
16 5/22/1997 -0.0083 -1.3448 66 7/31/1997 0.0081 1.3174 116 10/9/1997 -0.003 -0.4898
17 5/23/1997 0.0016 0.253 67 8/1/1997 0.0006 0.1052 117 10/10/1997 0.006 0.978
18 5/26/1997 -0.0011 -0.1779 68 8/4/1997 0.0034 0.5572 118 10/13/1997 -0.004 -0.6505
19 5/27/1997 0.0035 0.571 69 8/5/1997 0.0045 0.7264 119 10/14/1997 -0.0059 -0.9545
20 5/28/1997 0.0015 0.2366 70 8/6/1997 0.0017 0.2833 120 10/15/1997 -0.0031 -0.5072
21 5/29/1997 -0.0015 -0.2371 71 8/7/1997 0.0027 0.4327 121 10/16/1997 0.0051 0.8182
22 5/30/1997 0.0035 0.5693 72 8/8/1997 0.0014 0.2343 122 10/17/1997 0.0106 1.7174
23 6/2/1997 0.0044 0.7073 73 8/11/1997 -0.0042 -0.673 123 10/20/1997 -0.0062 -0.9942
24 6/3/1997 -0.0014 -0.2204 74 8/12/1997 0.0027 0.4421 124 10/21/1997 -0.0148 -2.3931
25 6/4/1997 0.0018 0.2892 75 8/13/1997 0.0053 0.8659 125 10/22/1997 -0.0079 -1.2851
26 6/5/1997 0.0015 0.2486 76 8/14/1997 -0.0069 -1.1168 126 10/23/1997 -0.0237 -3.8354
27 6/6/1997 -0.0082 -1.3355 77 8/15/1997 -0.0075 -1.219 127 10/24/1997 0.0095 1.5444
28 6/9/1997 0.0013 0.2122 78 8/18/1997 -0.0017 -0.2759 128 10/27/1997 -0.0038 -0.6115
29 6/10/1997 -0.0012 -0.1904 79 8/19/1997 -0.0112 -1.8082 129 10/28/1997 -0.0317 -5.0901
30 6/11/1997 -0.0026 -0.4286 80 8/20/1997 0.0065 1.0515 130 10/29/1997 0.0304 4.9204
31 6/12/1997 -0.0093 -1.5001 81 8/21/1997 0.0029 0.4718 131 10/30/1997 0.0013 0.2029
32 6/13/1997 0.0035 0.5667 82 8/22/1997 -0.0039 -0.6244 132 10/31/1997 0.0054 0.8823
33 6/16/1997 0.0019 0.3092 83 8/25/1997 0.0003 0.0484 133 11/3/1997 0.006 0.9641
34 6/17/1997 -0.0016 -0.2541 84 8/26/1997 -0.0041 -0.6693 134 11/4/1997 -0.0021 -0.3339
35 6/18/1997 -0.0059 -0.9591 85 8/27/1997 -0.005 -0.8099 135 11/5/1997 0.0001 0.0135
36 6/19/1997 -0.0011 -0.1765 86 8/28/1997 -0.0121 -1.9529 136 11/6/1997 -0.0077 -1.2506
37 6/20/1997 0.0029 0.4739 87 8/29/1997 -0.0133 -2.1465 137 11/7/1997 -0.0017 -0.2701
38 6/23/1997 0.0026 0.4228 88 9/1/1997 -0.0226 -3.6528 138 11/10/1997 -0.0052 -0.8392
39 6/24/1997 -0.002 -0.3311 89 9/2/1997 -0.0043 -0.6916 139 11/11/1997 -0.0019 -0.3007
40 6/25/1997 0.0033 0.5284 90 9/3/1997 0.0202 3.2689 140 11/12/1997 -0.0069 -1.1175
41 6/26/1997 0.0055 0.889 91 9/4/1997 0.0035 0.5687 141 11/13/1997 -0.001 -0.1586
42 6/27/1997 -0.0022 -0.3577 92 9/5/1997 0.0051 0.823 142 11/14/1997 0.0031 0.5036
43 6/30/1997 0.0022 0.3542 93 9/8/1997 0.0066 1.0613 143 11/17/1997 0.0066 1.0698
44 7/1/1997 -0.0017 -0.2754 94 9/9/1997 0.0153 2.4763 144 11/18/1997 0.0065 1.0497
45 7/2/1997 -0.0082 -1.3292 95 9/10/1997 -0.0043 -0.7013 145 11/19/1997 -0.0054 -0.874
46 7/3/1997 0.0011 0.1739 96 9/11/1997 -0.0058 -0.9369 146 11/20/1997 -0.0059 -0.9451
47 7/4/1997 0.0035 0.5704 97 9/12/1997 -0.0059 -0.9564 147 11/21/1997 0.0089 1.4474
48 7/7/1997 -0.0001 -0.0173 98 9/15/1997 0.006 0.9708 148 11/24/1997 -0.0016 -0.2513
49 7/8/1997 -0.0043 -0.702 99 9/16/1997 -0.0087 -1.4001 149 11/25/1997 -0.0139 -2.2486
50 7/9/1997 -0.0032 -0.5232 100 9/17/1997 -0.0048 -0.7728 150 11/26/1997 0.0062 1.004
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Table 11: Estimation results - Fixed time effect and contagion - continued
k Date γˆt?+k t-value k Date γˆt?+k t-value k Date γˆt?+k t-value
151 11/27/1997 -0.0066 -1.0667 201 2/5/1998 -0.0004 -0.0591 251 4/16/1998 -0.0077 -1.2456
152 11/28/1997 -0.0042 -0.6862 202 2/6/1998 0.0077 1.2398 252 4/17/1998 0.0004 0.0677
153 12/1/1997 0.0048 0.7806 203 2/9/1998 0.0121 1.9657 253 4/20/1998 -0.0003 -0.0559
154 12/2/1997 -0.0015 -0.2501 204 2/10/1998 0.0077 1.2463 254 4/21/1998 -0.0005 -0.088
155 12/3/1997 -0.007 -1.129 205 2/11/1998 -0.0009 -0.1464 255 4/22/1998 -0.0029 -0.4766
156 12/4/1997 0.0069 1.1178 206 2/12/1998 -0.0154 -2.4868 256 4/23/1998 -0.0026 -0.4206
157 12/5/1997 0.0048 0.7809 207 2/13/1998 -0.0215 -3.4883 257 4/24/1998 0.0013 0.2171
158 12/8/1997 -0.0105 -1.6984 208 2/16/1998 -0.0161 -2.6067 258 4/27/1998 -0.0054 -0.879
159 12/9/1997 -0.0063 -1.0174 209 2/17/1998 0.0088 1.4272 259 4/28/1998 0.0011 0.1734
160 12/10/1997 -0.0102 -1.6532 210 2/18/1998 0.0077 1.2431 260 4/29/1998 -0.0037 -0.6019
161 12/11/1997 -0.0223 -3.5981 211 2/19/1998 0.0055 0.8917 261 4/30/1998 0.0006 0.1002
162 12/12/1997 -0.0198 -3.2044 212 2/20/1998 -0.0037 -0.6014 262 5/1/1998 -0.0022 -0.3621
163 12/15/1997 -0.0115 -1.8549 213 2/23/1998 -0.0004 -0.0684 263 5/4/1998 -0.0096 -1.5617
164 12/16/1997 0.007 1.1305 214 2/24/1998 0.0042 0.6732 264 5/5/1998 -0.0034 -0.5503
165 12/17/1997 0.0082 1.3324 215 2/25/1998 -0.0003 -0.0433 265 5/6/1998 -0.0169 -2.7259
166 12/18/1997 0.013 2.1008 216 2/26/1998 0.0044 0.7163 266 5/7/1998 -0.0043 -0.6937
167 12/19/1997 -0.0127 -2.0511 217 2/27/1998 0.0113 1.8294 267 5/8/1998 0.0071 1.1532
168 12/22/1997 -0.0183 -2.9709 218 3/2/1998 0.0032 0.5181 268 5/11/1998 -0.0025 -0.4096
169 12/23/1997 -0.0109 -1.77 219 3/3/1998 0.0048 0.7696 269 5/12/1998 -0.0023 -0.3801
170 12/24/1997 -0.0012 -0.1892 220 3/4/1998 -0.0068 -1.0932 270 5/13/1998 -0.0232 -3.7449
171 12/25/1997 0 -0.0037 221 3/5/1998 -0.0184 -2.9729 271 5/14/1998 -0.0015 -0.2369
172 12/26/1997 0.014 2.2628 222 3/6/1998 -0.0033 -0.5281 272 5/15/1998 0.0079 1.273
173 12/29/1997 0.0037 0.6043 223 3/9/1998 -0.0027 -0.432 273 5/18/1998 -0.0143 -2.3164
174 12/30/1997 -0.0029 -0.4754 224 3/10/1998 -0.0002 -0.0284 274 5/19/1998 0.0014 0.228
175 12/31/1997 -0.0027 -0.4332 225 3/11/1998 0.0019 0.3157 275 5/20/1998 0.0105 1.7003
176 1/1/1998 0 -0.0037 226 3/12/1998 0.002 0.326 276 5/21/1998 0.0065 1.0587
177 1/2/1998 -0.0062 -1.004 227 3/13/1998 0.0153 2.4726 277 5/22/1998 0.0038 0.6126
178 1/5/1998 -0.0106 -1.7055 228 3/16/1998 -0.0025 -0.4072 278 5/25/1998 -0.0026 -0.4153
179 1/6/1998 -0.0094 -1.5172 229 3/17/1998 0.0041 0.6641 279 5/26/1998 0.0015 0.2465
180 1/7/1998 -0.0161 -2.6053 230 3/18/1998 -0.0051 -0.8195 280 5/27/1998 -0.0149 -2.4072
181 1/8/1998 -0.0443 -7.1541 231 3/19/1998 0.0097 1.5668 281 5/28/1998 -0.012 -1.94
182 1/9/1998 -0.0061 -0.9896 232 3/20/1998 0.0063 1.0132 282 5/29/1998 0.0073 1.185
183 1/12/1998 -0.0148 -2.3858 233 3/23/1998 0.0051 0.8235
184 1/13/1998 0.0271 4.3879 234 3/24/1998 0.0014 0.2234
185 1/14/1998 0.0319 5.1294 235 3/25/1998 0.0009 0.1493
186 1/15/1998 -0.0184 -2.9825 236 3/26/1998 0.0016 0.2539
187 1/16/1998 0.0123 1.9929 237 3/27/1998 -0.0001 -0.0184
188 1/19/1998 0.0169 2.7277 238 3/30/1998 -0.0091 -1.468
189 1/20/1998 -0.0047 -0.7691 239 3/31/1998 -0.006 -0.9698
190 1/21/1998 -0.0058 -0.9374 240 4/1/1998 -0.0088 -1.4246
191 1/22/1998 -0.0282 -4.5619 241 4/2/1998 -0.0108 -1.7504
192 1/23/1998 -0.0054 -0.8689 242 4/3/1998 -0.0095 -1.5457
193 1/26/1998 0.0199 3.2154 243 4/6/1998 0.0014 0.2238
194 1/27/1998 0.018 2.9211 244 4/7/1998 0.0042 0.68
195 1/28/1998 0.0062 1.0114 245 4/8/1998 0.0091 1.4792
196 1/29/1998 0.0013 0.2103 246 4/9/1998 0.01 1.6174
197 1/30/1998 0.0144 2.324 247 4/10/1998 0.0011 0.1703
198 2/2/1998 0.044 7.0849 248 4/13/1998 0.0107 1.7279
199 2/3/1998 -0.0125 -2.0161 249 4/14/1998 -0.0063 -1.0272
200 2/4/1998 -0.0098 -1.5871 250 4/15/1998 -0.0044 -0.713
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Figure 5: Panel (a): Estimates of the Fixed Time Effects in equation (1), Panel (b): corre-
sponding t-values and 99 percent critical values
41




Fixed Time Effect Estimates Base Model
Fixed Time Effect Estimates Model with Hong Kong











t−values Model with Hong Kong exogeneous
Figure 6: Panel (a): Comparison of the Fixed Time Effects in equation (1) with and without
Hong Kong as an additional variable, Panel (b): corresponding t-values and 99 percent
critical values
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Figure 7: Robustness analysis: comparison of fixed time effect estimates of base period
with an extended period
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base model fixed time effect estimates
fixed time effect estimates without vulnerabilities









t−values, model without vulnerabilities
Figure 8: Robustness analysis: Impact of vulnerabilities. Panel (a): Comparison of esti-
mates of the Fixed time effects in equation (1) with and without controlling for vulnerabil-
ities, Panel (b): corresponding t-values and 99 percent critical values
44
Working Papers 
No Published   Title Author(s) 
1 May 2002 On Strategic Default and Liquidity Risk Demosthenes N. Tambakis 
2 June 2002 The Supervisory Approach: A Critique Jonathan Ward 
3 August 2002 Depreciation Bias, Financial-Sector Fragility and 
Currency Risk 
Demosthenes N. Tambakis 
4 December 2002 The New Basel Accord and Developing Countries:  
Problems and Alternatives 
Jonathan Ward 
6 January 2003 Economic Slowdown in the U.S., - The 
Revitalisation of Fiscal Policy and the Case for a Co-
Ordinated Global Reflation 
Alex Izurieta 
7 December 2003 Establishing a European Securities Regulator: Is the 
European Union an Optimal Economic Area for a 
Single Securities Regulator? 
Kern Alexander 
8 October 2003 Empirical Modeeling of Contagion: A Review of 
Methodologies 
Mardi Dungey, Renée Fry, Brenda 
González-Hermosillo & Vance L. Martin 
9 October 2003 International Financial Contagion: What Do We 
Know? 
Mardi Dungey & Demosthenes N. Tambakis
10 November 2003 Two-Country Stock-Flow-Consistent 
Macroeconomics Using a Closed Model Within a 
Dollar Exchange Regime 
Wynne Godley & Marc Lavoie 
11 November 2003 Testing for Changing Persistence in U.S. Treasury 
On/Off Spreads Under Weighted-Symmetric 
Estimation 
L. Vanessa Smith & Demosthenes N. 
Tambakis 
12 February 2004 Features of a Realistic Banking System Within a 
Post-Keynesian Stock-flow Consistent Model 
Wynne Godley & Marc Lavoie 
13 February 2004 Credit-Risk Transfer and Financial Sector 
Performance 
Wolf Wagner and Ian Marsh 
14 March 2004 Finance and Technical Change: A Neo-
Schumpeterian Perspective 
Carlota Perez 
15 April  2004 Simple Open Economy Macro with Comprehensive 
Accounting - A Radical Alternative to the Mundell 
Fleming Model 
Wynne Godley & Marc Lavoie 
16 May 2004 Towards a Reconstruction of Macroeconomics Using 
a Stock Flow Consistent (SFC) Model 
Wynne Godley  
17 July 2004 Corporate Governance and Bank Regulation: The 
Regulator as Stakeholder 
Kern Alexander 
18 January 2005 Credit Derivatives, the Liquidity of Bank Assets, and 
Banking Stability 
Wolf Wagner 
19 February 2005 A Simple Model of Three Economies with Two 
Currencies - The "Eurozone" and "The USA" 
Wynne Godley & Marc Lavoie 
20 February 2005 Simple Open Economy Macro with Comprehensive 
Accounting - A Two Country Model 
Wynne Godley & Marc Lavoie 
21 October 2005 Aggregate Liquidity Shortages, Idiosyncratic 
Liquidity Smoothing and Banking Regulation 
Wolf Wagner 
22 October 2005 Synchronisation of Financial Crises Mardi Dungey, Jan P.A.M. Jacobs & 
Lestano 
23 October 2005 Credit Derivatives and Sovereign Debt Crises Benedikt Goderis & Wolf Wagner 
24 October 2005 The US Treasury Market in August 1998: 
Untangling the Effects of Hong Kong and Russia 
with High Frequency Data 
Mardi Dungey, Charles Goodhart, 
Demosthenes Tambakis 
25 January 2006 Endogenous Contagion - A Panel Data Analysis Dirk Baur & Renee Fry 
 
Please address enquiries about the series to: 
The Administrator, Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance, Judge Business School,  
Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK, Tel: +44(0) 1223 764 115, E-Mail: admin@cerf.cam.ac.uk
 
 
, http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk 
 
